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THE  CAUSES  FOR  THE  FAILURE 
OF  OTERMIN'S  ATTEMPT  TO 
RECONQUER  NEW  MEXICO 
1681-1682 

By  CHARLES  W.  HACKETT 

University  of  California 


REPRINTED  FROM  "THE  PACIFIC  OCEAN  IN  HISTORY" 
BY  H.  MORSE  STEPHENS  AND  HERBERT  E.  BOLTON. 
THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY,  PUBLISHERS,  NEW  YORK 


Copyright,  1917,  By  The  Macmillan  Company. 


if^lrv- 


THE    CAUSES    FOR    THE    FAILURE    OF    OTERMIN^S 
ATTEMPT  TO  RECONQUER  NEW  MEXICO,  1681-82 

Charles  W.  Hackett 

The  occasion  for  a  discussion  of  the  causes  for  the  failure  of 
Governor  Otermm's  attempt  to  reconquer  New  Mexico  in  the 
winter  of  1681-82,  as  well  as  for  a  new  and  intensive  study  of  the 
broader  field  of  which  it  is  a  part,  namely,  the  Pueblo  revolt  and 
the  reconquest,  is  the  recent  acquisition  of  hitherto  unused  sources 
from  the  Mexican  and  Spanish  archives.  These  sources,  collated 
with  materials  in  the  New  Mexico  archives,  the  Bancroft  Collec- 
tion, and  the  Peabody  Museum,  cause  the  whole  subject  to  be 
seen  in  a  new  and  different  light.  In  the  present  paper  a  meagre 
sketch  of  the  narrative  of  the  Otermm  expedition,  the  outlines 
of  which  are  already  well  known,  will  be  necessary,  but  emphasis 
will  be  laid  not  only  upon  the  actual  causes  for  the  failure  of  the 
expedition,  but  upon  some  of  the  most  important  related  facts 
upon  which  new  light  has  been  thrown. 

As  a  result  of  the  Pueblo  uprising  in  New  Mexico  in  August 
1680,  in  which  three  hundred  and  eighty  civilians  and  twenty-one 
missionaries  lost  their  lives,  the  survivors,  numbering  over  two 
thousand  five  hundred  souls,  including  three  hundred  and  seven- 
teen Indian  allies,  retreated  under  the  leadership  of  their  governor, 
Don  Antonio  de  Otermin,  to  the  monastery  of  Nuestra  Senora 
de  Guadalupe  del  Paso.  There  succor  was  had  for  the  half- 
starved,  half-naked,  and  foot-sore  refugees,  through  the  kindness 
of  Father  Ayeta,  the  Franciscan  custodio  and  procurador  general 
of  the  province,  who  fortunately  had  just  arrived  at  El  Paso  from 
the  city  of  Mexico  with  a  wagon  train  of  supplies  for  the  mission- 
aries of  the  province.  There  a  halt  was  called  and  temporary 
settlements  were  established  in  the  vicinity  of  Guadalupe  del 

439 


440  THE  PACIFIC  OCEAN  IN  HISTORY 

Paso.  At  San  Lorenzo,  one  of  these  settlements  located  about 
twenty-five  miles  below  the  pueblo  of  El  Paso,  headquarters  for 
the  governor  and  for  the  cahildo  of  Santa  Fe  were  established,  and 
there  the  provincial  form  of  government  was  maintained  in  all 
of  its  detail.^ 

In  December  Father  Ayeta  went  to  Mexico  City,  carrying  with 
him  the  oflBcial  records  of  the  revolt  and  of  the  retreat,  and  various 
petitions  from  the  governor  and  leading  citizens  for  supplies  so 
that  they  might  attempt  a  reconquest  of  the  lost  province.  On 
January  7,  1681,  the  Junta  General  began  a  consideration  of  the 
New  Mexican  situation  and  by  the  end  of  the  month  had  arrived 
at  a  decision.  The  refugees  were  to  be  supplied  with  corn  and 
meat  until  October  1  at  royal  expense ;  grain  and  implements  for 
farming  were  to  be  furnished  so  that  the  settlers  might  become 
self-sustaining;  money  was  allowed  for  one  hundred  and  fifty 
pobladoreSj  or  settlers,  at  an  annual  stipend  of  two  hundred  and 
fifty  pesos  each ;  fifty  soldiers,  at  the  current  wage  of  three  hundred 
and  fifteen  pesos  annually,  were  provided  for  a  presidio,  which  was 
to  remain  at  El  Paso  until  the  province  was  reconquered;  and 
last  and  most  important  of  all,  orders  were  given  for  Otermin 
to  attempt  at  once  a  reconquest  of  New  Mexico  so  that  the  refu- 
gees might  return  to  their  ruined  homes.  It  is  thus  seen  that 
the  settlement  of  the  New  Mexico  refugees  at  El  Paso  was  intended 
to  be  only  temporary.  To  Father  Ayeta  the  Junta  General  on 
February  1,  1681,  assigned  the  duty  of  conducting  the  relief  train 
to  El  Paso  and  of  carrying  the  orders  of  the  superior  government 
to  Governor  Otermin.^ 

In  the  meantime  conditions  at  El  Paso  had  been  going  from 
bad  to  worse  and  before  Father  Ayeta  finally  arrived  a  number 
of  serious  dangers  had  arisen.  In  March  news  had  come  that 
the  Pueblos,  allied  with  the  Apaches,  were  planning  to  attack  El 

1  See  Hackett,  The  Revolt  of  the  Pueblo  Indians  of  New  Mexico  in  1680,  in  The 
Quarterly  of  the  Texas  State  Historical  Association,  vol.  15,  pp.  93-147 ;  and  The 
Retreat  of  the  Spaniards  from  New  Mexico  in  1680,  and  the  Beginnings  of  El  Paso, 
in  The  Southwestern  Historical  Quarterly,  vol.  16,  pp.  137-168,  and  259-276. 

'  Auttos  tocantes;  dl  Alsamiento  de  Los  Yndios  de  la  Provincia  de  la  Nucha  Mexico, 
folios  92-121,  Mss.  in  the  Archivo  General  y  Publico  de  Mexico,  Provincias 
Internas,  tomo  37.  (See  Bolton,  Guide  to  Materials  for  the  History  of  the  United 
States  in  the  Principal  Archives  of  Mexico,  94.)  Transcripts  of  the  documents  in 
the  above-cited  expediente  are  now  in  the  private  collection  of  Dr.  Herbert  E. 
Bolton,  to  whom  I  am  indebted  for  their  use. 


THE  CAUSES  OF  OTERMIN'S  FAILURE  441 

Paso,  in  which  they  expected  to  be  joined  by  the  Christian  Pueblos 
there  and  by  the  native  Mansos  and  Sumas  Indians.^  The  suppHes 
furnished  by  Father  Ayeta  had  only  been  calculated  to  last  until 
March  1,  1681,  at  which  time  it  was  thought  succor  could  be  had 
from  Mexico  City.  By  April  5,  however,  no  word  had  come  from 
there  and  the  store  of  supplies  had  run  so  low  that  unless  replen- 
ished it  could  last  the  settlers  only  thirty  more  days.  Urgent 
appeals  for  help  were  sent  to  the  governor  of  Nueva  Vizcaya,  and 
foraging  expeditions  were  sent  to  Casas  Grandes  and  Parral  to 
buy  grain  and  cattle  on  the  credit  of  the  governor's  name.^  In 
July  the  Piros  and  Tigua  allies  had  plans  all  laid  to  revolt,  kill 
as  many  Spaniards  as  possible  and  then  return  to  their  pueblos ; 
but  these  plans  were  discovered  in  time  to  be  suppressed.^  Many 
of  the  refugees  had  deserted  upon  their  arrival  at  El  Paso,  and  in 
the  face  of  starvation  and  danger  of  Indian  attacks  discontent 
was  so  strong  that  many  others  left  their  families  in  El  Paso 
and  went  to  Casas  Grandes,  Parral,  and  other  adjacent  places  in 
search  of  individual  succor,  while  others  deserted  in  the  full  sense 
of  the  word.  In  short,  matters  were  such  that  Governor  Otermin 
officially  recorded  his  belief  that  if  the  situation  was  not  relieved 
soon  El  Paso  would  either  have  to  be  abandoned,  thereby  in- 
creasing the  risk  to  all  northern  New  Spain,  or  the  settlers  must 
needs  die  of  starvation.* 

It  was  not  until  September  7,  1681,  that  Father  Ayeta  reached 
San  Lorenzo  with  the  belated  train  of  supplies  from  Mexico  City 
and  the  orders  from  the  superior  government  for  Otermin  to  at- 
tempt a  reconquest  of  the  province.  But  before  his  arrival  the 
news  that  the  viceroy  and  Junta  General  had  given  instructions 
for  Otermin  to  lead  a  military  expedition  to  New  Mexico  had 
been  received,  and  an  official  announcement  had  been  made  at 
both  San  Lorenzo  and  the  pueblo  of  El  Paso  nearly  a  week  before 

1  Tanto  Sacado  a  la  Letra  de  los  autos  fulminados  de  los  Indios  que  Binieron  del 
nuevo  mexo.  llamados  Alonsso  Shimitigua  Baltasar  y  thomas  que  su  Thenor  a  la  letra 
es  Como  se  Sigue,  folios  1-8.     Mss.  in  the  Bancroft  Collection. 

2  Expediente,  No.  4,  folios  1-9.  Original  Mss.,  in  the  New  Mexico  Archives  at 
the  Library  of  Congress.  (See  Twitchell,  The  Spanish  Archives  of  New  Mexico, 
vol.  2,  pp.  3-4.) 

3  Expediente,  No.  7,  folios  1-16  (incomplete)  in  ibid.  (See  Twitchell,  op.  cit., 
69-70) ;  folios  17-18.  These  two  folios  of  the  expediente,  having  become  separated 
from  the  rest,  are  in  the  Bancroft  Collection. 

*  Expediente,  No.  4,  folios  1  and  9,  in  ibid. 


442  THE  PACIFIC  OCEAN  IN  HISTORY 

the  arrival  of  Father  Ayeta.^  This  news  was  but  a  signal  for  a 
fresh  outburst  of  discord  and  discontent  among  the  settlers,  for 
after  what  they  had  just  passed  through  an  expedition  to  New 
Mexico  proved  a  most  unwelcome  subject.  Father  Ayeta  him- 
self best  described  the  general  situation.  He  stated  that  when 
he  reached  Parral  on  August  2,  he  heard  rumors  that  the  settlers 
at  El  Paso  had  come  to  regard  the  reconquest  as  impossible  be- 
cause additional  soldiers  were  not  being  sent  from  Mexico.  This, 
he  said,  surprised  and  grieved  him,  for  when  he  left  El  Paso  the 
year  before  he  felt  that  the  citizens  were  so  anxious  for  help  to 
return  to  a  reconquest  of  their  country  that  to  accomplish  it  they 
would  even  be  willing  to  eat  stones ;  that  without  any  doubt  the 
greatest  joy  in  the  world  would  be  theirs  on  the  day  when  the 
viceroy  would  supply  them  with-  necessities  for  returning  to  the 
proposed  reduction.^  But  on  the  9th  of  September,  the  people 
having  been  called  together  by  Otermm,  even  before  the  viceroy's 
despatch  had  been  read  to  them,  "there  was  not  lacking  one," 
so  Father  Ayeta  stated,  "to  cause  difficulties  and  embarrassments. 
From  which,  and  from  many  reports  which  he  received  in  a  short 
time,  he  learned  that  all  the  sincerest  courage,  zeal,  the  promises, 
and  the  desires  to  return  to  the  conquest  manifested  in  Salineta,  not 
only  by  their  mouths  but  over  their  signatures,  which  the  superior 
government  holds,  had  been  changed  to  cold  indifference.  And  he 
learned  that  there  was  no  dearth  of  leading  citizens  who  in  place 
of  strength  caused  weakness.  But  he  did  what  human  strength 
could  to  encourage  them  and  he  remonstrates  with  his  Lordship 
for  having  failed  to  aid  him  in  carrying  the  heavy  load  which  he 
bears  as  his  strength  permits.  .  .  .  And  some  being  relatives  of 
others  and  following  their  leadership,  the  matter  reached  such  a 
state  that  the  expense  having  been  incurred,  it  was  seen  that  it 
would  be  most  difficult  to  make  the  entrada.  And,  were  it  not  that 
God  never  permits  that  there  be  lacking  many  good  men  where 
there  are  bad,  who  promptly  and  obediently,  without  replies  or 
metaphysics,  enter  into  the  service  of  the  king,  due  credit  being 

1  Autos  Pertenecientes  a  el  alcamiento  de  los  Yndios  de  La  Proyfl  del  nuebo  Mexfio 
Y  la  entrada,  Y  subcesos  de  ella  que  se  hico  para  su  recuperacion,  folio  62.  Transcripts, 
in  Bolton  Collection,  of  Mss.  in  the  Archive  General  y  Piablico  de  Mexico,  Provin- 
cias  Internas,  34.  (See  Bolton,  Guide,  92.)  Also  Expediente,  No.  8,  folio  1,  New 
Mexico  Archives.     (See  Twitchell,  op.  cit.,  70.) 

2  Autos  Pertenecientes,  etc.,  folio  61. 


THE  CAUSES  OF  OTERMlN'S  FAILURE    '         443 

given  to  his  Lordship  who  led  many  out  of  the  error  they  had 
been  in  by  his  good  example,  there  would  have  been  no  entrada."  ^ 

In  the  face  of  all  this  dissatisfaction  Otermm  the  day  after 
the  arrival  of  Father  Ayeta  began  preparations  for  carrying  out 
the  viceroy's  orders.  A  general  muster  of  the  citizens  and  a  re- 
view of  all  of  their  equipment  was  begun  and  orders  were  issued 
for  all  deserters  to  return  to  El  Paso.  The  aid  of  the  officials  of 
Nueva  Vizcaya  and  Sonora  was  implored  in  this  matter,  but  it 
is  worthy  of  note  that  not  a  half  dozen  of  such  deserters  responded 
to  their  governor's  call  in  the  two  months  preceding  the  departure 
of  the  expedition.^ 

In  the  meantime  dissatisfaction  at  El  Paso  grew  apace  and 
again  on  September  21,  Father  Ayeta  came  to  the  rescue.  Speak- 
ing of  himself  in  the  third  person  he  says :  "  It  was  asked  of  him  that 
he  continue  the  aid,  for  if  he  agreed  and  continued  to  give  it  diffi- 
culties would  be  removed.  So  he  granted  anew  another  2000 
cattle  and  2000  fanegas  of  grain  in  the  name  of  his  Majesty." 
In  this  way  actual  opposition  to  the  plans  was  quieted  and  the 
next  day  the  governor  began  making  the  payments  to  the  set- 
tlers. The  following  day  the  list  of  soldiers  for  the  presidio  was 
made  known  and  the  soldiers  paid.  Ayeta  is  authority  for  the 
statement,  however,  that  the  supply  money  was  so  placed  that 
the  number  of  dissatisfied  settlers  exceeded  the  number  of 
satisfied  ones,  "an  accident,"  he  adds,  "which  the  great  prudence 
of  his  Lordship  overcame  and  made  bearable  that  the  service  of 
their  majesties  might  be  accomplished.  And  for  his  part  his 
Paternity  took  all  possible  precautions,  caressing  them  and 
petting  them,  with  no  slight  mortification  and  disgust,  until  God 
wished  that  they  should  move."  ^ 

Finally  on  November  5  the  force  left  Guadalupe  del  Paso. 
On  November  7  at  the  Ancon  de  Fray  Garcia,  six  leagues  above 
Guadalupe,  a  general  review  and  muster  was  held  and.  it  was  found 
that  there  were  one  hundred  and  thirty  trained  soldiers,  sixteen 
raw  recruits,  one  hundred  and  twelve  Indian  allies,  twenty-eight 

1  Autos  Pertenecientes,  etc.,  folios  62-63. 

'  Expediente,  No.  8,  folios  1,  33,  and  65  in  New  Mexico  Archives.  (See  Twitchell, 
op.  cit.,  70.) 

'  Expediente,  No.  6,  folios  28-30  in  New  Mexico  Archives ;  Expediente,  No.  5, 
folios  1-26  in  ibid.;  Expediente,  No.  8,  folios  34-40,  in  ibid.;  Autos  Pertenecientes, 
63. 


444  THE  PACIFIC  OCEAN  IN  HISTORY 

servants,  nine  of  whom  were  armed,  at  least  three  reUgious,  in- 
cluding Father  Ayeta,  and  one  boy,  thus  making  a  total  of  about 
two  hundred  and  ninety  persons.  The  soldiers  carried  in  all  nine 
hundred  and  forty-eight  horses  and  mules  and  the  religious  doubt- 
less thirty  or  forty  more.  The  military  equipment  was  deficient 
in  many  respects.  Excepting  Governor  Otermin  and  Francisco 
Xavier,  the  Secretary  of  Government  and  War,  only  twenty-five 
soldiers  were  provided  with  complete  outfits  of  personal  arms 
and  full  cavalry  equipment.  Thirty-six  others  carried  outfits 
of  personal  arms,  but  were  not  provided  with  full  cavalry  equip- 
ment; three  possessed  complete  outfits  of  personal  arms  only; 
thirty-four  had  a  full  outfit  of  personal  arms  w^ith  the  exception  of 
a  terno;  and  one  carried  all  his  personal  arms  with  the  exception 
of  a  terno  and  a  leather  jacket.  Of  the  other  forty-five  one  pos- 
sessed only  an  arquebus,  another  only  a  leather  shield,  while 
among  the  remaining  forty-three  there  were  in  all  fourteen  swords, 
fourteen  arquebuses,  ten  shields  (chimales),  eight  leather  shields 
(adargas),  six  daggers,  two  jackets,  four  lances  and  three  leather 
jackets.  None  of  these  men  possessed  more  than  one  of  each 
kind  of  the  above  mentioned  articles,  while  only  six  men  possessed 
as  many  as  four  of  the  articles.^ 

While  by  this  time  actual  opposition  to  the  expedition  had 
been  hushed  there  was  still  an  almost  utter  lack  of  confidence  in 
the  success  of  the  undertaking.  This  is  best  illustrated  by  a 
statement  of  Otermin  himself,  made  in  the  auto  calling  for  the 
muster  of  November  7,  to  the  effect  that  he  believed  it  would  be 
impossible  to  succeed  on  the  expedition,  which,  he  said,  he  was 
forced  to  undertake  out  of  deference  to  his  "  obligation  as  a  vassal 
and  in  order  to  give  just  fulfillment  to  the  mandates  and  orders" 
of  the  viceroy  and  Junta  General.^  During  the  first  fourteen  or 
fifteen  days  of  the  march  the  soldiers  were  tractable,  seeing,  as 
Father  Ayeta  stated,  that  there  was  no  remedy  for  it.  But  as 
they  approached  the  settled  country  of  the  Pueblos  even  the  most 
meritorious  began  to  fear  the  first  encounter  with  the  Indians.^ 
Selecting  seventy  of  the  most  valorous  ones  Otermin  with  them, 

1  Autos  Pertenecientes,  folio  4 ;  Expediente,  No.  8,  folios  65-73,  in  New  Mexico 
Archives. 

2  Expediente,  No.  8,  folio  65,  in  New  Mexico  Archives. 
» Autos  Pertenecientes,  folio  63. 


THE  CAUSES  OF  OTERMIN'S  FAILURE  445 

on  December  6,  surprised  and  captured  Isleta  and  soon  after 
received  the  submission  of  the  entire  population,  numbering  ^ve 
hundred  and  eleven  souls/  and  not  fifteen  hundred  and  eleven,  as 
Bancroft   states.^ 

On  the  eighth  of  December  Otermin  despatched  the  lieutenant- 
general  of  the  cavalry,  Juan  Dominguez  de  Mendoza,  with  seventy 
mounted  soldiers  and  some  Indian  allies  to  reconnoiter  the  country 
above,  while  he  occupied  himself  with  various  duties  in  Isleta.  The 
Indians  above  Isleta  had  heard  of  the  arrival  there  of  the  Spaniards 
and  at  once  had  taken  to  the  mountains.  Mendoza  was  gone 
ten  days  and  advanced  as  far  as  La  Cieneguilla,  passing  through 
the  pueblos  of  Alameda,  Puaray,  Sandia,  San  Felipe,  Santo  Do- 
mingo, and  Cochiti.  At  La  Cieneguilla  parleys  were  held  with  the 
assembled  Indians,  numbering  over  one  thousand  warriors,  and 
peace  pacts  were  made,  by  the  terms  of  which  Mendoza  was  to 
allow  the  Indians  three  days  in  which  to  submit  to  the  Spaniards' 
rule  and  return  to  their  pueblos.  He  and  his  men  then  returned 
to  Cochiti  to  await  the  expiration  of  the  period.  At  the  end  of 
that  time,  no  Indians  having  come,  it  was  ascertained  through 
spies  and  through  deserters  from  the  Indian  camp  that  the  Indians 
had  only  made  terms  in  order  to  gain  time,  that  warriors  from 
all  over  the  kingdom  were  flocking  to  the  standard  of  Catiti,  Don 
Luis  Tupatu  and  other  native  chieftains,  and  that  there  were 
several  well  laid  schemes  to  entrap  the  Spaniards  and  get  rid  of 
them  at  one  fell  swoop.  l&SOCItfttlJtK^IW 

As  soon  as  Mendoza  learned  this  he  beat  a  hasty  retreat  and  the 
next  day  joined  Otermm's  division,  which  by  this  time  had  ad- 
vanced northward  from  Isleta  and  was  encamped  opposite  the 
pueblo  of  Alameda,  which  the  governor  had  already  destroyed, 
together  with  Puaray  and  Sandia.^  It  may  be  remarked  in  pass- 
ing that  the  records  kept  by  Otermin  at  this  time  disprove  the 
long  accepted  theories  as  to  the  location  of  the  three  above-men- 
tioned pueblos  and  show  conclusively  that  Alameda  was  about 
eight  leagues  above  Isleta  and  on  the  same  or  west  side  of  the 
stream,  that    Puaray   was   one   league   above   Alameda   but  on 

1  Auto8  Pertenecientes,  folios  8  and  101-102. 
*  Bancroft,  Arizona  and  New  Mexico,  p.  188. 
'  Autos  Pertenecientes,  folios  10-57. 


446  THE  PACIFIC  OCEAN  IN  HISTORY 

the  east  bank  of  the  river  and  that  Sandia  was  one  league  above 
Puaray  and  on  the  same  side  of  the  stream.^ 

The  return  of  the  Mendoza  party  with  its  discouraging  reports 
was  the  real  turning  point  in  the  outward  policy  of  the  expedition. 
Whatever  had  been  the  half-hearted  attitude  up  to  that  time  there 
could  henceforth  be  no  doubting  the  keen  opposition  to  remain- 
ing in  the  country.  Father  Ayeta  stated  that  Otermin,  disgusted 
with  the  failure  of  the  Mendoza  party,  determined  to  select 
seventy  men  and  go  in  person  to  chastise  the  rebels.  To  ascertain 
the  general  opinion  on  this  point  Father  Ayeta  made  a  touf  of 
the  camp.  He  found  in  some  of  the  soldiers  "such  rebelliousness 
and  in  others  such  arguments"  that  he  realized  the  hopelessness 
of  the  project.  "Those  who  had  horses,"  he  added,  "looking 
at  nothing  but  their  own  convenience,  although  the  sky  should 
fall,  would  not  lend  them  to  their  own  fathers,  much  less  to  the 
governor."  In  short,  not  ten  men  were  found  who  were  willing 
to  accompany  the  expedition.^  To  discuss  the  general  situation 
Otermin,  on  December  23,  called  a  junta  de  guerra?  Father 
Ayeta,  the  first  one  of  the  thirty-one  participants  to  give  an 
opinion,  stated  emphatically  that  he  did  not  believe  that  there 
was  any  prospect  of  Otermm's  being  able  to  inflict  further  punish- 
ment on  the  apostates,  and  recommended  a  retreat  to  Isleta,*  so 
that  that  pueblo  might  be  safeguarded  until  a  decision  could  be 
reached.  With  Father  Ayeta,  who  had  done  so  much  to  inspire 
the  soldiers  for  the  undertaking,  discouraged,  there  could  be  little 
hope  for  further  efforts  at  reconquest.  In  the  discussion  that 
followed  emphasis  was  laid  on  the  fact  that  the  unusually  hard 
winter  had  so  exhausted  the  horses  that  many  soldiers  were  doing 
scout  duty  on  foot;  that  the  Isleta  Indians  were  deserting  and 
returning  to  apostasy  while  those  loyal  to  the  Spanish  cause  were 
liable  to  be  attacked  by  the  rebels;  and  that  the  place  where 
they  were  was  unsuited  for  defense,  and  short  of  firewood.  The 
majority  voted  to  retreat  for  the  present  to  Isleta.  Four  voted 
to  continue  the  entrada  and  three  were  in  favor  of  leaving  for  San 
Lorenzo  at  once.     Otermin,  as  can  be  imagined,  yielded  to  public 

1  See  Hackett,  The  Location  of  the  Tigua  Pueblos  of  Alamedor,  Puaray,  and  Sandia 
in  1681,  in  Old  Santa  Fe,  vol.  2,  pp.  381-391. 
'  Autos  Pertenecientea,  folios  63-64. 
'  Ibid.,  pp.  56-57. 
4  Ibid.,  foUo  64. 


THE   CAUSES  OF  OTERMIN'S  FAILURE  447 

opinion  and  ordered  a  retreat  to  Isleta,  where  his  force  arrived  on 
December  30.  The  next  day  another  junta  was  held,  and  it  was 
unanimously  agreed  to  retreat  at  once  to  El  Paso.  Isleta  was 
burned  as  were  all  of  the  other  pueblos  visited  except  San  Felipe, 
Santo  Domingo,  and  Cochiti,  and  on  January  2  the  force  began  its 
march  down  the  river. ^ 

In  summing  up  the  achievements  of  the  expedition  little 
can  be  said.  A  distance  of  more  than  a  hundred  and  twenty-five 
leagues  had  been  traversed.  Five  hundred  of  the  sixteen  thousand 
apostates  had  been  absolved  and  received  again  into  the  church, 
although  over  one  hundred  of  these  had  apostasized  again  during 
the  Spaniards'  absence.  Eight  pueblos,  including  Isleta,  which 
was  the  only  one  that  was  not  found  deserted,  had  been  burned, 
and  with  them  a  quantity  of  grain  estimated  at  four  thousand 
fanegas.  Three  other  deserted  pueblos  had  been  sacked  and  a 
great  quantity  of  beans  and  other  things  consumed.  Only  one 
encounter  with  the  Indians  is  recorded  and  this  was  at  Isleta, 
the  only  pueblo  as  far  south  as  the  Piros  country  which  did  not 
participate  in  the  revolt  of  the  preceding  year.  There  the  na- 
tives only  let  fly  a  few  arrows,  for,  being  attacked  at  daybreak, 
they  were  unable  to  ascertain  who  the  invaders  were,  and  at  first 
took  them  to  be  Apaches.  The  offensive  operations  of  the  Men- 
doza  party,  as  we  have  seen,  amounted  to  nothing.  In  short  it 
is  worthy  of  comment  that  the  death,  or  even  the  wounding,  of 
not  a  single  person  on  either  side  is  noted. 

What  then  can  be  assigned  as  the  cause  for  so  little  having  been 
accomplished  on  so  long  an  expedition  ?  The  actual  opposition  en- 
countered before  the  expedition  set  out,  the  lack  of  confidence  in  the 
undertaking  from  the  governor  down,  even  from  the  very  begin- 
ning, and  the  unwilling  resignation  to  the  inevitable  on  the  part  of 
the  soldiers  on  the  march  could  only  presage  an  unsuccessful 
expedition.  Under  such  conditions  there  could  have  been  little 
hope  for  overcoming  such  trials  and  discouragements  as  were 
caused  by  the  severe  weather,  the  failure  of  the  horses,  and  the 
flight  of  the  Indians  to  the  mountains  rather  than  surrender, 
while  a  vigorous  offensive  campaign  against  the  apostates  was  out 
of  the  question. 

1  AiUoa  Pertenecientea,  folios  65-95. 


448  THE  PACIFIC  OCEAN  IN  HISTORY 

That  such  a  campaign  was  possible,  however,  and  that  the 
failure  of  the  expedition  was  not  regarded  by  the  officials  as  due 
to  a  scarcity  of  men  and  equipment  was  pointed  out  in  no  uncer- 
tain terms  by  the  royal  fiscal  in  Mexico  City  later  on.  His  review 
of  the  expedition  is  interesting  and  altogether  enlightening.  He 
says  in  part :  "  In  the  pueblos  which  were  set  on  fire  more  than 
4000  fanegas  of  grain  were  burned,  besides  a  great  quantity  of 
beans.  And  it  must  be  noted  that  this  quantity  did  not  include 
that  which  the  carts  and  pack  train  carried  and  that  which  they 
threw  to  the  animals ;  that  in  the  pueblos  of  Cochiti,  San  Felipe, 
San  Ildefonso,  Santa  Ana,  and  Sia,  there  was  a  great  quantity  of 
grain  and  other  supplies,  as  the  lieutenant-general,  Juan  Dominguez, 
related  in  those  letters  of  which  mention  has  been  made ;  that  at 
least  there  might  have  been  collected  another  4000  fanegas,  which 
he  left  to  the  enemy,  and  likewise  the  houses  of  the  above- 
mentioned  pueblos,  without  having  set  fire  to  them.  And  it  seems 
that  if  the  governor  had  ordered  that  all  of  said  grain  should  be 
collected  in  the  pueblo  of  Puaray,  which  is  in  the  central  part 
and  at  a  short  distance  from  the  others,  he  could  have  made  him- 
self secure  in  it,  having  plenty  of  grain  to  sustain  his  force,  and  to 
feed  to  the  horses  and  mules  at  night,  taking  them  out  during 
the  day  to  feed  in  the  fields,  for  in  his  letters  the  lieutenant  in- 
formed him  that  on  both  sides  of  the  river  the  feed  and  stubble  was 
more  than  good  in  that  vicinity.  And  having  finished  gathering 
in  the  crop  of  corn  there  could  not  fail  to  have  been  a  large  quantity 
of  husks  and  stalks  of  the  corn  itself,  equally  good  feed  for  the 
horses  and  mules.  In  this  way  it  would  have  been  possible  to 
maintain  the  army  many  months  in  the  said  pueblo,  which 
is  in  the  central  part  of  the  province  and  from  ten  to  twelve 
leagues  distant  from  the  villa  of  Santa  Fe.  And  the  apostates 
being  in  the  sierras  during  the  snowy  season,  without  houses, 
and  with  few  provisions,  the  discomforts  of  cold  and  hunger 
would  have  reduced  them  to  the  necessity  of  submission,  while 
the  cause  for  the  weakness  of  the  horses,  which  was  the  main 
pretext  for  the  retreat,  would  have  been  removed,  since  with 
a  few  days  of  rest  and  feeding  on  corn  they  would  have  been 
fatter  and  stronger  than  when  they  left  the  camp  of  San  Lorenzo. 
And  the  other  pretext,  that  the  surrendered  Indians  in  Isleta  were 


THE  CAUSES  OF  OTERMIN'S  FAILURE'  449 

in  danger,  vanishes  because  of  the  ease  with  which  they  could  have 
been  taken  with  the  army  to  the  said  pueblo  of  Puaray  where  they 
would  be  more  secure  than  left  alone  as  they  were  in  Isleta,  merely 
on  the  strength  of  their  word  and  with  the  power  of  carrying  away 
the  many  provisions  which  they  had  there. 

"And  when  their  safety  is  doubted  that  doubt  may  be  dis- 
pelled by  what  persons  experienced  in  Indian  warfare  say,  for 
example  will  not  be  found  in  all  New  Spain  where  Indians  have 
dared  to  offer  battle  to  so  many  persons  as  the  army  numbered, 
mounted,  provided  with  arms  and  ammunition,  and  intrenched 
in  a  pueblo,  nor  even  to  attack  those  with  less  defence  unless  it 
were  by  surprise.  For  it  continually  happens  that  twenty  armed 
men  with  powder  and  munitions,  make  thousands  of  Indians  re- 
treat although  it  may  be  in  the  open  country.  And  when  any- 
one attempts  to  deny  this  pure  and  notorious  truth,  laying  aside 
many  other  examples  to  prove  it,  that  will  be  sufficient  which  the 
governor  himself  experienced  in  the  villa  o|  Santa  Fe.  For  not- 
withstanding that  all  the  apostates  had  been  called  together  for  the 
uprising,  and  that  this  news  had  caught  him  unawares  and  with- 
out any  preparation  to  resist  such  a  general  assemblage,  and  the 
Indians,  being  so  wrought  up  that  in  all  of  the  other  pueblos  of 
that  district  they  had  already  killed  the  priests  and  all  the  Span- 
iards, without  sparing  the  children  and  women,  yet  the  said  gov- 
ernor, having  placed  himself  in  defense  with  only  one  hundred 
men  who  could  bear  arms,  not  only  repelled  the  attack  of  such  a 
multitude  of  Indians  as  had  surrounded  him,  but,  having  repulsed 
them,  put  them  to  flight,  killing  more  than  three  hundred,  besides 
forty-seven  others  whom  they  caught  in  a  house  where  they  killed 
them  with  lances.  And  seeing  that  his  lieutenant-general  in  Rio 
Abajo,  Alonso  Garcia,  was  not  giving  him  aid,  he  decided  to  leave, 
retiring  with  his  followers  from  the  said  villa  of  Santa  Fe,  as  he 
did,  the  greater  part  of  them  coming  on  foot  and  burdened  with 
women  and  children  and  the  necessary  supplies.  And  with  only 
one  hundred  horses  he  came  retreating  through  the  same  pueblos 
of  Sandia,  Alameda,  and  Isleta,  where  the  apostates  had  risen. 
In  this  way,  with  very  few  supplies,  and  in  sight  of  the  enemy  who 
followed  them,  revealing  themselves  on  the  hills  and  ridges,  he 
marched  to  the  place  called  Fray  Cristobal,  which  is  distant  from 


450  THE  PACIFIC  OCEAN  IN  HISTORY 

the  villa  and  capital  of  Santa  Fe,  from  where  they  set  out,  seventy- 
leagues,  without  the  apostates  having  dared  to  give  him  battle 
in  all  this  distance  with  its  very  narrow  passes,  nor  to  come  upon 
them,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they  [the  Indians]  had  a  great  num- 
ber of  horses,  and  some  guns,  powder,  and  ammunition,  which 
they  had  taken  from  the  Spaniards. 

"And,  if  on  that  occasion,  when  they  were  so  disordered  and 
were  travelling  on  foot  and  with  so  great  a  number  of  women  and 
children,  and  the  few  horses  which  they  were  bringing  lean,  on 
account  of  having  been  shut  up  the  nine  days  that  they  were 
besieged,  the  Indians  did  not  dare  to  attack  them,  even  when  they 
passed  through  the  same  pueblos,  then  it  is  clearly  demonstrated 
that  if  those  who  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  army  should  retire 
would  recall  this  event  they  would  find  all  the  motives  with 
which  they  upheld  the  retirement  to  have  vanished.  For,  in  order 
to  maintain  themselves  in  the  pueblos  referred  to  they  had  the 
supplies  in  them  which  have  already  been  mentioned ;  with  eight 
hundred  and  fifty  horses  and  other  animals ;  provided  with  arms 
and  munitions  and  without  women  and  children  to  defend ;  and 
the  apostates  in  the  woods  and  mountains  in  the  season  of  much 
snow,  burdened  with  a  whole  rabble  and  with  very  few  provisions ; 
so  that  it  was  very  likely  not  only  that  it  could  maintain  itself 
but  also  that  the  rebels  would  necessarily  have  to  surrender. 
Meanwhile  they  could  have  sent  for  aid  to  El  Paso,  Casas  Grandes, 
and  Parral  for  their  greater  security. 

"  Comparing  then,  the  forces  and  supplies  with  which  the  gover- 
nor retired  at  the  time  of  the  uprising  with  those  which  are  found 
in  his  second  retreat  the  great  difference  will  be  recognized.  And 
if  the  enemy  then  did  not  have  the  boldness  to  attack  him  they 
would  have  less  boldness  now,  seeing  our  men  better  provided  and 
in  greater  number.  And  it  is  not  reasonable  that  there  should 
have  been  horses  and  mules  able  to  retreat  more  than  one  hun- 
dred and  thirty  leagues  and  yet  insuflBcient  and  too  lean  to  go 
back  to  burn  the  pueblos  of  San  Felipe,  Santo  Domingo,  and 
Cochiti,  and  the  provisions  which  were  in  them,  which  duty  the 
lieutenant-general  Juan  Dominguez  de  Mendoza  had  failed  to 
execute.  For  it  is  only  six  leagues,  and  from  ten  to  twelve  to 
the  villa  of  Santa  Fe,  from  the  pueblo  of  Sandia  where  the 


THE  CAUSES  OF  OTERMIN'S  FAILURE,  451 

retreat  was  begun,  thereby  frustrating  the  recovery  of  that  kingdom 
which  they  had  so  well  under  way  that  it  was  certain  of  success 
if  he  had  maintained  himself  in  the  said  pueblos."  ^ 

Such,  in  support  of  the  above  conclusions,  was  the  opinion  of 
the  royal  fiscal,  when,  upon  the  receipt  of  the  official  autos  kept 
by  Governor  Otermm,  he  made  a  report  to  the  viceroy. 

1  Autos  Pertenecientes,  folios  116-118. 


4 


